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TO FRACK OR NOT TO FRACK? THE INTERACTION OF JUSTIFICATION AND 
POWER IN A SUSTAINABILITY CONTROVERSY 
 
Abstract 
 
How could a de facto moratorium on shale gas exploration emerge in Québec despite the broad 
adoption of fracking in North American jurisdictions, support from the provincial government 
and a favorable power position initially enjoyed by the oil and gas industry? This paper analyzes 
this turn of events by studying how stakeholders from government, civil society, and industry 
mobilized modes of justification and forms of power with the aim to influence the moral 
legitimacy of the fracking technology during a controversy surrounding shale gas exploration. 
Combining Boltanski and Thévenot’s economies of worth theory with Lukes’ concept of power, 
we analytically induced the justification of power mechanisms whereby uses of power become 
justified or ‘escape’ justification, and the power of justification mechanisms by which 
justifications alter subsequent power dynamics. We finally explain how these mechanisms 
contribute to explaining the controversy’s ultimate outcome, and advance current debates on 
political corporate social responsibility. 
 
Key-words: corporate social responsibility, fracking, justification, moral legitimacy, power, 
shale gas 
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INTRODUCTION 
Political CSR (PCSR) approaches inspired by Habermasian, stakeholder, and institutional 
theories have highlighted the central role of ‘moral legitimacy’ in the processes by which 
stakeholder groups intervene in sustainability controversies to influence their outcomes (Frynas 
and Stephens, 2014; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). Building on Habermas’ concepts of 
communication and deliberative democracy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer, Palazzo and 
Seidl, 2013), these approaches suggest that multiple stakeholder groups attempt to shape the 
moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of sustainability issues to establish a normative consensus 
(Bauer and Palazzo, 2011; Mena and Palazzo, 2012). However, this research has done little to 
explain how stakeholder groups compete in shaping the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of 
sustainability issues in institutional arenas. 
Another group of scholars suggest that stakeholder groups intervene in sustainability 
controversies mainly through coercion or manipulation to advance their agendas and shape the 
institutions in which the discussions take place to promote their own interests (Banerjee, 2010; 
Fleming and Jones, 2013). These critics tend to describe the Habermasian PCSR perspective as 
‘naïve’ if not ‘utopian’ (Fleming and Jones, 2013, pp. 45-46, 85-86) because of its limited 
appreciation of the differential powers attached to the stakeholders involved in these negotiation 
processes; they insist on the need to better theorize and account for the role of power when 
studying sustainability (Banerjee, 2010). However, the work of these critics rarely considers that 
efforts of stakeholders to influence moral legitimacy may in turn shape power dynamics. 
This paper seeks to address these limitations by considering the dynamics of both power and 
justification to analyze how stakeholders interact in a sustainability controversy; we aim to 
explain how the relationships between power and justification influence the controversy’s 
ultimate outcome. Theoretically, we combine Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006 [1991]) economies 
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of worth (EW) framework with Lukes’ (2005 [1974]) conception of power. The EW provides a 
tool to unpack the processes by which stakeholders justify their claims on moral grounds 
(Patriotta, Gond and Schultz, 2011). Lukes’ (2005) definition of power enables a consideration of 
observable uses of power, such as authority or coercion, but also of subtler processes by which 
stakeholders defuse conflicts by preventing issues from reaching institutional arenas through 
agenda setting or impose their views by making the changes they support appear unavoidable. 
To investigate the interactions of justification and power as well as the effects of their 
interactions, we examine a controversy surrounding the exploration of shale gas in Québec 
(Canada) between March 2010 and December 2011. We selected this case for its relatively 
‘unique’ and ‘extreme’ nature (Yin, 2008). Indeed, the controversy led to a de facto moratorium 
on shale gas exploration in October 2012, despite the initial support of the provincial 
government, the presence of powerful lobby groups from oil and gas corporations advocating in 
favor of shale gas exploitation in Québec, and the facilitation of shale gas extraction in the 
neighboring context of several other Canadian provinces and the United States, where it has been 
made a strategic priority for the government. Following an inductive and reflexive case study 
approach, such an unexpected turn of events offers opportunities for interesting ‘theoretical 
reconstructions’ (Burrawoy, 1998, p. 16). 
Through our analysis, we ‘analytically induce’ (Bansal and Roth, 2000) neglected ‘social 
mechanisms’ (Stinchcombe, 1991) that bridge power and justification through the controversy. 
The justification of power mechanisms explain how prior uses of power constrain or enable 
specific modes of moral legitimation by delegating the work of justification to other stakeholder 
groups (delegation) or by amplifying the possible modes of justification through power relations 
(multiplication). The power of justification  mechanisms explain the effects of justification on the 
capacity to mobilize forms of power either by altering the perceived uncertainty of the issue 
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(reshaping perceived uncertainty) or by restricting uses of power through the reorientation of 
institutions toward their original purpose (recovering institutions). Our findings show how these 
mechanisms explain the main shifts in the turn of the controversy, leading to its ultimate outcome 
in the form of a de facto moratorium. Finally, we discuss how the justification-power framework 
we induced from our case study contributes to the study of PCSR, power and justification. We 
then derive the main theoretical and practical implications of our analysis. 
MANAGING MORAL LEGITIMACY: BRIDGING JUSTIFICATION AND POWER 
Moral Legitimacy in Sustainability Controversies 
Central to PCSR studies is the recognition that corporations do not operate in a social and 
political vacuum but are embedded in systems of governance  that reflect social networks as well 
as state action (Gond, Kang and Moon, 2011; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). Because the regulatory 
environments of the corporation are shaped by the interplay of civil society and industrial actors, 
the boundaries of the ‘division of labor’ among corporations, nation-states and civil society 
organizations change continually , creating constant ‘overflows’ among the social, political and 
business spheres. These overflows are the focus of PCSR studies (Frynas and Stephens, 2014). 
According to the ‘Habermasian perspective’ on PCSR, the management of moral legitimacy 
takes on central importance in this new context (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011). Moral legitimacy (or illegitimacy) is defined as the moral acceptability (or 
unacceptability) of an organization’s behavior that results from a normative evaluation by 
external observers (Suchman, 1995). In sustainability controversies, corporations and their 
stakeholders deal with moral legitimacy ‘to reach a consensus (or at least an informed 
compromise) and ultimately a new match between organizational practices and societal 
expectations that will (re)establish legitimacy’ (Scherer et al., 2013, p. 264). According to this 
point of view, PCSR research needs to focus on how processes and institutions can help 
7 
 
legitimize the political power of corporations to make them democratically accountable (Bauer 
and Palazzo, 2011). Research inspired by this perspective has investigated the management of 
moral legitimacy through a variety of institutions and has stressed the importance of civil society 
organizations in CSR-related controversies (Mena and Palazzo, 2012; Mena and Waeger, 2014). 
However, this line of study has been criticized on its normative and political fronts. On the 
normative side, even though Habermasian works stress the importance of managing moral 
legitimacy, they do little to explain how stakeholders concretely justify their claims by anchoring 
them in specific moral orders. On the political side, the Habermasian line of inquiry has been 
criticized for under-theorizing power (Banerjee, 2010; Fleming and Jones, 2013). To address 
these two limitations, we rely on Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) concept of justification and 
Lukes’ (2005) ‘radical’ view of power. 
An Economies of Worth Perspective on Justification 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) economies of worth (EW) framework provides a useful 
alternative to the Habermasian deliberative approach to ‘unpack’ stakeholders’ justifications that 
shape the moral legitimacy or illegitimacy of CSR issues in a controversy. Patriotta et al. (2011) 
have shown how this framework can be used to analyze how stakeholder groups compete in 
institutional arenas by providing justifications consistent with moral principles reflecting 
conceptions of the ‘common good’. 
Central to the EW theoretical apparatus is the description of ‘common worlds’ dominated by 
‘orders of worth’ that provide actors with systematic and coherent shared moral principles that 
can be deliberately mobilized across different contexts in their justification efforts. The empirical 
works of Boltanski, Thévenot and their colleagues have identified a set of at least seven common 
worlds, governed by different higher orders of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Lafaye and 
Thévenot, 1993). The civic world values civic duties and collective over particular interests in the 
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search for the common good; its idealized representation is offered by Rousseau’s treatise The 
Social Contract (1994 [1762]). The green world values nature, the biosphere, and the harmonious 
relationship among humans, fauna, and flora (Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993). The industrial world 
is driven by the search for efficiency and standardization; it values invention, technology, and 
science. The market world is that of competing actors driven by their self-interests to achieve 
commercial gains from their transactions; its archetypal form is described by Adam Smith (1991 
[1776]). The domestic world is a world of traditions within which loyalty and the respect of 
hierarchy and authority are highly valued. The inspired world is the place of creation, and it 
values the spontaneous vision, dreams, and imagination of the individual artist. Finally, the world 
of fame or reputation values the achievement of public recognition and recognizes the importance 
of others’ judgment. As a whole, these worlds constitute a ‘grammar of justification’ through 
which actors can build their claim that their position reflects the ‘common good’. 
Stakeholders are assumed to appreciate all common worlds and to have the cognitive 
flexibility to engage with their plurality in the context of justification (Boltanski, 2012). To 
evaluate the worth of a situation, a technology, or an object, stakeholders may mobilize specific 
‘tests of worth’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Such tests may focus either on the confirmation 
or the determination of appropriate orders of worth. The first case reflects an evaluation of a 
‘state of worth’ (is a technology actually ‘green’ according to a given standard?), whereas the last 
case corresponds to a ‘test of worth’ (should a technology be evaluated according to its creativity 
[inspired world] or monetary value [market world]?). 
The EW framework provides a model to account for the conflicting set of critiques through 
which stakeholders embedded in different ‘worlds’ oppose each other’s arguments by evaluating 
the worth of their arguments through various tests. This framework approaches the management 
of moral legitimacy in the context of CSR issues as a process of deliberative communication in 
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which multiple stakeholders mobilize different orders of worth to establish the moral legitimacy 
of their points of view (Patriotta et al., 2011). In so doing, it contributes to shaping a 
controversial practice as either morally legitimate or illegitimate and, accordingly, to the social 
acceptance or rejection of a practice—or even its continued controversial status. 
In its original version published in 1991, the EW framework describes a specific ‘regime of 
action’ in which actors deliberately refuse to rely on violence, coercion or any other form of 
domination (Boltanski, 2012). As explained by Luc Boltanski: 
Power relations do not play an important role in the frame of analysis chosen for the 
economies of worth. They are not a subject matter of On Justification, but not because we 
thought power relations were non-existent (quote reported by Basaure, 2011, p. 369). 
In their more recent works, the promoters of the EW framework have begun to theorize the 
relationships between the justification regime of action and specific forms of power, such as 
domination, notably by considering the role of institutions and change (Boltanski, Fraser and 
Corcuff, 2014; Susen and Turner, 2014). Boltanski (2011, pp. 124-43) in particular suggests that 
two political regimes of domination may persist, even in democratic contexts, through strategic 
approaches to justification. First, powerful actors may deny the reality of tests of worth that 
threaten their power. Second, domination may be exercised by imposing a specific justification 
for change as being unavoidable and desirable; this justification becomes an ideology that 
suffices to disqualify any criticisms or alternative choices as reactionary. Boltanski (2011) labels 
this second form of interplay between justification and domination ‘managerial’ or ‘complex’ 
effects of domination. 
Although these developments show that, from an EW perspective, justification and power do 
interact, Boltanski (2011) focuses on a specific form of power—domination—and his analysis 
deals with macro-social issues rather than the meso-level of analysis that corresponds to 
stakeholders’ interactions in sustainability controversies. To complement this line of inquiry, we 
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now introduce a broader conceptualization of power. 
A Radical Perspective on Power 
Paradoxically, despite the close relationships between the concepts of politics and power in the 
social sciences (Arendt, 1958), PCSR in general and the Habermasian view in particular have 
been criticized for lacking sound conceptualizations of power (Banerjee, 2010; Fleming and 
Jones, 2013). To address this limitation, we build on Lukes’ (2005) ‘radical’ conceptualization of 
power in our exploration of how justification and power interface. 
Lukes (2005) defines power by considering ‘that A exercises power over B when A affects B 
in a manner contrary to B’s interests’ (p. 37). This definition overlaps with prior definitions and 
notably encompasses forms of power evident in observable behaviors such as coercion (Dahl, 
1957), which refers to the threat of deprivation to force compliance, usually by blocking access to 
resources. This definition also accounts for the use of authority to influence others or for any 
other ‘legitimized’ forms of power obtained through political consensus regarding the pursuit of 
collective goals (Parsons, 1967, p. 308). 
However, Lukes’ (2005) conceptualization moves beyond these behavioral and ‘visible’ 
facets of power and elaborates on the earlier works of Bachrach and Baratz (1970) to capture 
latent forms of power that can exist even without an overt conflict. Indeed, the definition 
provided by Lukes is also compatible with manipulation, a second dimension of power whereby 
‘actors seek to either limit the issues that are discussed or fit issues within (what are perceived to 
be) acceptable boundaries’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2014, p. 242). Manipulation is usually expressed 
through agenda setting, and it aims at preventing issues from reaching the relevant institutional or 
political arena. Finally, Lukes’ (2005) conceptualization recognizes that power is also a capacity 
that does not necessarily have to be exercised overtly or covertly to influence other actors (p. 34). 
He thus advances a third dimension of power that corresponds to domination and refers to the use 
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of ideology to make relations of power appear ‘inevitable’ and ‘natural’ by shaping the subjective 
and real interests of actors. 
As a whole, Lukes’ (2005) approach considers four facets of power: authority, coercion, 
manipulation, and domination. This rich conceptualization recognizes that ‘the most effective and 
insidious use of power is to prevent conflict from arising in the first place’ (p. 31). It sees power 
as a capacity, and it focuses on control over the political agenda in considering both current and 
potential issues. Interestingly for our purposes, Lukes (2005) sets aside the question of 
investigating ‘whether rational persuasion is a form of power and influence’, and he does not 
theorize the relationship between power and modes of legitimation beyond his discussion of 
Parsons’ (1967) definition of ‘legitimized’ power as authority, although he recognizes the 
importance of the moral foundations of power (see Lukes, 2005, pp. 36-7). 
In what follows, we rely on Lukes’ (2005) radical concept of power and Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s (2006) concept of justification to inductively analyze how stakeholders’ mobilization 
of justification and forms of power are related to each other and how the relationships between 
power and justification influence the controversy’s ultimate outcome. 
METHODS AND DATA 
Case Selection: Identifying a Sustainability Controversy 
Our empirical focus is on the ongoing controversy surrounding the exploration of shale gas in 
Québec, Canada. We chose this context for two main reasons. First, as in the case of nuclear 
energy, several economic, technical, environmental, and health and safety uncertainties surround 
the exploration of shale gas. A recurrent issue in the shale gas industry is the hydraulic fracturing 
technique used for its extraction. Known as ‘fracking,’ this technique consists of blasting large 
amounts of water, sand, and chemicals at high pressure down a well in order to crack adjacent 
rock structures and free up the gas (IEA, 2012). The main hazards of fracking include the 
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possible contamination of water tables by dangerous chemicals released in the process, the 
release of methane into the atmosphere, and seismic risks (Shonkoff, Hayes and Finkel, 2014). 
Second, the 1912 Mining Act makes the case of Québec particular. In Canada, the 
underground belongs to the Crown, which ‘delegates’ it to the provinces—in contrast to the US, 
where underground exploration and exploitation rights belong to the individual who ‘owns’ the 
piece of surface land. Québec’s provincial government has the unencumbered power to issue gas 
or petroleum permits to private or corporate owners who may be different from the surface land’s 
owners. Providing corporate actors with the rights to exploit the underground in inhabited 
territories—possibly against the will of individuals who own the land on the surface or the will of 
the local authorities (e.g. city councils)—was likely to create conflict, so the prospect of shale gas 
extraction led to intense debates. 
Data Collection 
To uncover the dynamics through which stakeholders influenced the moral legitimacy of shale 
gas exploration through ‘justifications’, we relied primarily on press coverage and complemented 
these data with insiders’ interviews to gain further insights into covert and latent forms of power 
mobilized by the stakeholders. Appendix A provides the list of our primary data sources. 
Newspaper reports. Several criteria guided our selection of media: (1) availability in an 
electronic format for the purpose of systematic content analysis; (2) inclusion of regional, city-
based, and national newspapers; (3) a balanced representation of different political orientations in 
Québec; and (4) a focus on daily newspapers to track the progress of the controversy. Using these 
criteria led to the list of newspapers presented, together with a set of key descriptors, in Appendix 
A. We first searched for all articles using the expression ‘shale gas’ published during the two-
year period between March 2010 and December 2011; this search yielded 2,266 articles. All were 
read once to confirm that they related to our controversy. Of these, only 196 articles were found 
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to focus on shale gas extraction in Québec. 
Interviews with key informants. We were able to interview 12 key informants who were either 
prominent members of the main stakeholder groups or frontline observers directly involved in the 
fracking controversy in Québec. The sensitivity of the issue is shown by the number of 
prospective interviewees (9 people) who refused to meet despite close personal connections with 
some of the research team members. Our questions focused on the interviewees’ role in the 
controversy, their perceptions of each category’s position in the debate, and the main shifts in 
stakeholders’ discourse and actions. We also used the interview as a ‘site’ to investigate the 
presence of power and its expression. 
Other sources of information. We supplemented our data collection with other sources of data to 
better understand the full context of the controversy, to control for newspaper biases, and to 
triangulate our analysis, including communications and reports from official agencies, as well as 
those of the commission in charge of evaluating the environmental impact of shale gas extraction, 
and previous studies of the controversy (e.g. Batellier and Sauvé, 2011). 
Data Analysis and Coding 
Stage 1 – Temporal bracketing. To make sense of our longitudinal dataset, we employed 
Langley’s (1999) ‘temporal bracketing’ technique to isolate distinct periods within the 
controversy’s intertwined elements. We constructed a chronicle of key events, using the facts 
gleaned from newspaper reports and secondary data. This enabled us to identify the main turning 
points in the controversy that structured the whole debate.
i
 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Then, we plotted ‘media traffic,’ quantified press coverage, and justifying arguments 
advanced by various actors to evaluate whether our periods were consistent with the 
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representation of the controversy in press reports. Figure 1 presents the outcome of this analysis, 
showing the intensity of the controversy at each structured period.  
Stage 2 – Identification and quantification of common worlds. In line with Patriotta et al. 
(2011), we used N-Vivo software to conduct a systematic content analysis of all 196 newspaper 
articles focused on the controversy. We first coded all the passages corresponding to forms of 
justification that could be attributed to particular stakeholders, identifying a total of 640 such 
justifications, each of which consisted of a coherent unit of meaning—either one sentence or a 
short paragraph of 2 to 4 concise phrases. This analysis allowed us to construct a list of the 
controversy’s key stakeholders, which we grouped under convenient categories.ii We then 
identified whether each utterance corresponded to a justification involving one or several of the 
‘common worlds’ described by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), using the refined list of semantic 
descriptors provided by Patriotta et al. (2011, pp. 1815-16). Though helpful, this list of 
descriptors did not replace the researchers’ interpretation of each of the 640 units of meaning 
corresponding to justifications. Each unit of meaning was double-coded by two of the authors of 
the paper. Table I provides illustrations of coding for each of these ‘common worlds’. In many 
cases, justification involved several ‘common worlds’. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Following prior studies focused on the dynamics of legitimacy accounts (Patriotta et al., 
2011), we also counted the occurrence of phrases of justification to evaluate the intensity of 
actors’ justifications. The most popular forms of justification mobilized by stakeholders were 
derived from the civic world (42 percent of the 900 occurrences), followed by the green and the 
industrial worlds (19 and 17 percent, respectively), then the market world (12 percent), the 
domestic world (7 percent) and, finally, the inspired and the fame worlds (2 and 1 percent, 
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respectively). Table II shows which orders of worth were mobilized by the main stakeholder 
groups (government, civil society organizations, and the oil and gas industry association) at each 
of the three phases of the controversy. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II, III AND IV ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Stage 3 – Analysis of the mobilization of power by stakeholders. To identify the various facets 
of power mobilized by stakeholder groups, we proceeded in three steps. We first built a narrative 
of the controversy based on our secondary data. This helped us identify plausible uses of power 
by each stakeholder group over the three phases of the controversy. Then, we conducted a content 
analysis of our interviews (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), relying first on the typology of power 
proposed by Fleming and Spicer (2014) that integrates most of the conceptualizations of power in 
the literature. Moving back and forth from data to theory, we could identify the four facets of 
power conceptualized by Lukes (2005), namely, authority, coercion, manipulation and 
domination, in our data. 
Although the uses of authority and coercion are easily observable forms of power in 
conflicts in which some stakeholder groups’ have clearly opposed interests, our interviewees 
provided us with invaluable insights about subtler approaches to manipulation and domination 
that we could hardly have qualified as such. Table III provides a definition and an overview of 
the coding for each form of power as well as illustrations from our interview and newspaper data. 
Each of the 15 instances of power we identified are grounded in multiple sources of empirical 
evidence, always including the testimony of at least two interviewees. At the third and final stage, 
we verified whether we could trace these forms of power in our secondary data to confirm the 
uses of power. 
Once we had documented how modes of justification (Stage 2) and forms of power (Stage 3) 
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were mobilized by each stakeholder group through the controversy—as shown in Table II and 
reported in our first findings—we were in a position to analytically induce patterns of interactions 
between justification and power. 
Stage 4 – Induction of social mechanisms bridging power and justification. We examined, on 
the one hand, the effects that a shift in the uses of power at each phase had on modes of 
justification at subsequent phases. On the other hand, we examined the effects that a shift of the 
mode of justification at each phase had on the uses of power at subsequent phases. For instance, 
we observed that at Phase I, stakeholder A may use a form of power (coercion through direct 
threat to another stakeholder) that may be difficult, if not impossible, to justify from a moral 
ground at Phase II and thus avoid any test of worth. In contrast, if at Phase I, stakeholder B uses 
another facet of power (e.g. manipulation through networking) that develops his/her relationships 
with stakeholders C and D, who operate from different common worlds, unprecedented 
possibilities of justification at Phase II may be created for stakeholder B. Accordingly, shifts in 
the use of power may constrain or enable subsequent justifications. Reciprocally, we found that 
justifications can either constrain or enable subsequent uses of power. 
Consistent with Stinchcombe’s (1991) definition of ‘social mechanisms’ as ‘bits of theory 
about entities at a different level (e.g. individuals) than the main entities being theorized about 
(e.g. groups), which serve to make the higher-level theory more supple, more accurate, or more 
general’ (p. 367), we identified recurrent relationships between shifts in uses of power and shifts 
in modes of justification that constitute explanatory patterns or ‘process drivers’ (Langley, 1999, 
p.  904), and we created labels for them. Through this analysis, we induced two categories of 
mechanisms, which we labeled the justification of power and the power of justification. The 
justification of power mechanisms explain how power constrains or enables subsequent uses of 
justification, whereas the power of justification mechanisms explain how justifications constrain 
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or enable subsequent uses of power. Table IV provides a definition of these mechanisms and of 
their links to specific facets of power and justification that are described in our second findings.  
Stage 5 – How social mechanisms influence moral il/legitimacy. Finally, we investigated how 
the aforementioned mechanisms influenced stakeholders’ interactions over time and produced 
social effects that led to the specific outcomes in fracking’s moral legitimacy. This analysis 
suggests that the justification of power and power of justification mechanisms may play a role 
both within and across stakeholder groups, notably by shaping the repertoire of justifications or 
modes of power available to other stakeholders. Our third findings explain how the mechanisms 
contributed to the final outcome by shedding light on their role through the whole controversy. 
CONTEXT: CALLING FOR A TEST OF THE WORTH OF FRACKING  
Although shale gas exploration activities with fracking technology began as early as 2009, issues 
related to ‘fracking’ did not hit the news before June 2010. The controversy emerged in March 
2010, when groups of citizens from the Richelieu Valley municipalities, together with 
environmental NGOs, raised public concerns about the environmental and public health impacts 
of shale gas exploration in the provincial media. Prior to this, the industry and the provincial 
government had promoted the exploration of shale gas reserves. Shale gas was often presented as 
a real ‘bonanza’ for the province, likely to create between ‘7,500’ and ‘61,000’ jobs. Activists 
pointed to the lack of reliable publicly available information on the ecological impacts of 
fracking and underlined the lack of previous public consultation on the initial exploration stages. 
In so doing, they called for an evaluation of the ‘worth’ of the fracking technology. 
The publication of two surveys on shale gas in the weekend supplements of Le Devoir and 
La Presse in June 2010 turned this localized episode of activism into a central item in provincial 
politics. The two official opposition parties, the sovereigntist Parti Québécois and the left-wing 
Québec Solidaire, brought up the issue in Québec’s National Assembly, further questioning the 
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government on four issues. First, the opposition parties asked how this resource would benefit the 
province. Second, they questioned the safety of the fracking technology. Third, they resumed 
long discussions about the appropriateness of the mining regulatory framework, already criticized 
for being too protective of investors’ interests to the detriment of local inhabitants. Fourth, they 
questioned the transparency of the process by which prospecting licenses had been awarded. 
These concerns gained considerable traction in the media and in public opinion following the 
Québec screening of the US documentary Gasland, which illustrates the side effects of fracking.  
MOBILIZATIONS OF JUSTIFICATIONS AND POWER 
Phase I (March–December 2010): Unearthing Gas and a Controversy 
Justification. The accumulation of concerns called for a ‘test of worth’ of the fracking 
technology and pushed the stakeholders involved in this controversy to intensify their 
justification activities. As Table II shows, stakeholder groups mobilized arguments from the civic 
(38.23 percent), green (20.14 percent), industrial (18.09 percent), market (12.29 percent), and 
domestic (10.58 percent) worlds to justify or question the use of the technology. 
The oil and gas industry association mainly used the market order of worth in its few 
interventions during this period, seeking to spread the idea that shale gas extraction would 
generate jobs and create wealth in many communities in the province. However, they also played 
on the green register in presenting shale gas as a clean energy, tacitly bringing in the domestic 
order of worth, with its spokesperson making comparisons to the value of Hydro-Québec, the 
provincial utility company. The government’s justification efforts converged with those of the oil 
and gas industry association. Ministries represented shale gas as a unique opportunity for the 
economic development (market order) of the province, which could create jobs and enhance the 
welfare of all Québecers (civic and domestic orders). 
Premier Jean Charest and Natural Resources Minister Nathalie Normandeau do not hide their 
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enthusiasm for shale gas, seeing jobs, billions of dollars in new investments and the end of 
$2 billion a year in natural-gas imports from Alberta. (The Gazette, 05/03/2011) 
In contrast with these strategies, civil society organizations relied mainly on the industrial 
order of worth, for instance, when asking the government to conduct more systematic and 
scientific research on the potential environmental and social impacts of shale gas. These 
organizations relied mainly on civic and industrial orders of worth and combined their justifying 
arguments with a critique of fracking aligned with the green order of worth. Civil society 
organizations also argued against the idea that shale gas is a ‘greener’ source of energy, 
maintaining that its exploitation might have unintended environmental consequences, such as 
water and soil contamination from the chemicals involved in the process. They also suggested 
that shale gas could increase greenhouse gas emissions. 
Power. As shown in Table II, all three stakeholder groups not only engaged in justification 
efforts but also mobilized various forms of power. During the first months of the controversy, the 
government used its authority and manipulation to avoid the pressing demands for a ‘test of 
worth’ of the fracking technology by referring the issue to the office in charge of public hearings 
on environmental issues, the Bureau d'Audiences Publiques sur l'Environnement or BAPE, 
literally ‘the Office for Public Hearings on the Environment’.iii First, the government set the 
agenda by narrowly framing the BAPE’s mandate such that it explicitly excluded a moratorium 
and focused on the conditions for the implementation of a new industry. Second, in creating the 
BAPE committee, the government excluded experts who were skeptical about shale gas. 
According to our interviewees, the low profile and discretion of the gas industry at this first 
stage should not obscure its covert use of manipulation through the mobilization of its networks 
to influence Jean Charest’s liberal government. The government became the de facto 
‘spokesperson’ for the industry as the ministries did the job of ‘selling’ shale gas to Québecers, 
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relying mainly on arguments and figures provided by the industry. The industry negotiated 
directly with locals to start drilling as soon as possible, engaging in coercion through control over 
legal and economic resources with the aim to postpone or avoid lengthy public hearings. 
According to our interviewees, some industry representatives even contemplated suing the civil 
society representatives they perceived as being vehemently opposed to shale gas based on what 
the industry perceived as untrue statements. 
Our interviews with leading figures from civil society organizations suggest that this 
stakeholder group relied mainly on manipulation and, more sporadically, on coercion or 
authority to counter-balance the power of the industry and government groups. In terms of 
manipulation, civil society organizations enhanced their network position by enrolling groups 
that cut across different social spheres (e.g., local mayors of villages impacted by fracking, 
academics, artists and opposition parties). Also, civil society organizations aimed to directly 
pressure the government and the oil and gas industry through coercion by organizing 
demonstrations to amass and motivate the population; however, the demonstrations both in rural 
areas and in Montréal did not bring out an impressive number of people. In parallel, civil society 
groups sporadically yet successfully mobilized authority by engaging in forms of ‘linguistic 
resistance’. During industry-organized information meetings featuring international experts, civil 
society representatives insisted on being addressed in French (a legal right in Québec). This 
reinforced the local Francophone media’s support for the opponents of shale gas. 
Phase II (January 2011–April 2011): Politicization of the Controversy 
Justification. From January 2011, the debate intensified around the question of whether the 
province should put the whole industry on hold and call for a moratorium while further studies 
were conducted. As Table II shows, despite the anchoring of this new turn in the controversy in 
the industrial order of worth, stakeholder arguments were mainly relocated to the civic space, and 
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they mobilized the civic (46.77 percent), industrial (18.04 percent), market (13.14 percent) and 
green (15.92 percent) worlds in their justification efforts. 
Civil society organizations and the oil and gas industry association both relied on the civic 
order of worth to justify their opposing positions on a moratorium. The former questioned the 
industry’s benefits for Québecers and its capacity to ‘frack’ responsibly: 
‘Industry representatives have spent months maintaining that things would be done correctly, 
that what we’ve seen in the United States wouldn’t happen in Québec, all the while calling 
anyone a scaremonger who expressed a legitimate concern or asked too many questions’ … 
wrote Steven Guilbeault, deputy executive director of Équiterre. (Le Devoir, 29/01/2011) 
The industry association kept using economic arguments to justify fracking. It also combined 
the civic and market orders of worth to build a stronger case for shale gas. However, civil society 
organizations contested these arguments, suggesting that the economic benefits might come at the 
cost of a negative environmental impact, again relying strongly on the green order of worth. 
From their point of view, a moratorium on fracking was the best choice for Québecers, as full 
technical information on the technology’s environmental impact was not yet available.  
After the BAPE’s report was published, the government continued to mobilize the industrial 
and green orders of worth, but now their arguments approached the initial claims of civil society 
groups, arguing that more data were needed to make a properly informed decision about whether 
exploration should continue. In parallel, the government continued its battle against the 
moratorium by using the market and civic orders of worth, stressing the industry’s potential 
positive economic impact in terms of job creation, community infrastructure, and royalties.  
Power. The polarization of the majority government and its opposition parties on the shale gas 
issue received intense media attention. Both the sovereigntist and left-wing opposition parties 
engaged in manipulation through agenda setting by questioning the government’s ability to 
enforce legislation on shale gas, and both called for an immediate moratorium on shale gas 
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development in Québec. The government, on the other hand, while clearly opposing the idea of a 
moratorium, accepted the demands for a ‘strategic environmental evaluation’. In addition, once 
uncertainties related to fracking were recognized by experts, the government distanced itself from 
the industry and engaged in manipulation by repositioning its location in the power network. The 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Wildlife was replaced by the Ministry of Sustainable 
Development, Environment, Wildlife and Parks. 
Civil society organizations benefitted from increasing support from opposition parties and 
growing media visibility and began to be more structured and better organized. They became a 
coherent social movement, engaging in coercion through the collection and diffusion of 
alternative information about shale gas. The ‘scientific collective’ reached over 100 scholars from 
different universities who helped representatives of civil society groups use reliable information 
about fracking on the ground for manipulation through agenda setting in BAPE hearings across 
the province; they could thus influence the debate. 
The oil and gas industry association made an interesting move toward domination as their 
main use of power in January 2011 by appointing Lucien Bouchard as the president of the 
industry association. Bouchard is a previous Prime Minister of Québec and the founder of Bloc 
Québécois, the main sovereigntist opposition party on the federal stage. His nomination 
represents a move toward a more conciliatory position focused on the interests of Québec as a 
whole, and it could be regarded as an attempt to defuse the opposition’s arguments against shale 
gas. This change can be seen as an attempt at ‘manufacturing consent’. 
Crucial shifts from Phase I to Phase II. After intense pressure from civil society organizations, 
by January 2011, leaks had been found in 19 of the 31 shale gas wells inspected by the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Wildlife. In addition, at the end of February 2011, the BAPE released 
their first report on the issue. Its conclusion was that more information was needed to evaluate the 
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impact of the shale gas industry in Québec. Both events cemented a shift in public opinion 
toward perceiving fracking as risky in several regards. 
Phase III (April 2011–February 2012) – Spreading and Cooling-down 
Justification. As Table II shows, while the civic (35.26%), industrial (16.32%), and green 
(19.21%) orders of worth still dominated the framing of discursive justifications, the government 
and the oil and gas industry association had mobilized the market (13.42%) position consistently 
from the beginning of the controversy, and the domestic (12.37%) order of worth became more 
important at this final phase. 
During this phase, the oil and gas industry association’s arguments refocused on the market, 
civic, domestic and even green orders of worth, insisting on the economic benefits of shale gas 
for the province and on the use of this gas as an alternative source of energy. The government, 
while trying to align itself with those calling for more information and affirming that the BAPE 
recommendations would be followed, also continued to mobilize the market, civic, domestic and 
green orders of worth to stress the economic benefits of shale gas. 
The opposition parties held to their support for civil society organizations, and they 
mobilized the civic order of worth to question the price Québecers would have to pay for these 
benefits. 
Since the beginning of 2011, three reports made by credible authorities have proved that we 
don’t know enough about it to throw ourselves into gas extraction, an extraction that we 
don’t know will be advantageous to society. Without counting the many public statements by 
experts, who for months have delivered a series of statements ranging from the potential 
environmental risks to the need to nationalize the resource. (Le Devoir, 02/04/2011)  
In addition, civil society and opposition parties persisted in using the green and the civic 
orders of worth, arguing that further environmental problems might follow from shale gas 
exploration. 
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Power. In this third phase, the debate around the controversy started to cool down, and a broad 
consensus emerged on the need for more technical studies after the BAPE’s report. The 
government, using its formal authority, mobilized the BAPE as a mechanism to prove its 
transparency and its commitment to the provincial population and decided to call for a strategic 
environmental assessment on fracking and the shale gas industry. The oil and gas industry 
continued to communicate through former Prime Minister Lucien Bouchard to promote the shale 
gas industry and to indicate that everything had to be done to respect the law as it stood in a 
continued effort to dominate by ‘manufacturing consent’ within the province. Finally, civil 
society organizations saw their claims supported by society’s wide mobilization against the 
government’s position. Direct forms of coercion were engaged to pressure the government. For 
instance, on June 18
th
, 2011, a protest drew 10,000 people to the streets of downtown Montreal 
asking for an immediate moratorium on shale gas. Civil society organizations, now more 
organized and better structured, gained a central position in the stakeholder net and thereby 
consolidated their manipulation capacity.  
Crucial shift from Phase II to Phase III. The publication of the BAPE report on February 28
th
, 
2011 led to diverse reactions in the following months.
iv
 The Québec government formally 
declared that it would follow the BAPE’s recommendations, which involved taking more time for 
further research and public consultation before moving forward with exploration. This shift in the 
government’s public attitude toward fracking led to the decision of calling for a strategic review 
of this technology and its impacts for Québecers, which equated in the following months to a de 
facto moratorium. 
To unpack how the interactions of justification and power have influenced the crucial turns 
of the controversy and led to this surprising outcome, we analytically induced the mechanisms 
that related the mobilization of modes of justification to uses of forms of power. 
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FOUR MECHANISMS BRIDGING POWER AND JUSTIFICATION 
Justification of Power Mechanisms 
Mechanism 1a: Delegation. For a given stakeholder group, delegation means letting another 
stakeholder group or person engage in justification and speak in the name of the common good, 
as a result of having relied on forms of power that are difficult to justify from a moral point of 
view (e.g., overt forms of manipulation or coercion). A striking illustration of this mechanism 
occurred when the industrial association enrolled Lucien Bouchard, a former Premier of Québec, 
to promote the benefits of shale gas in general and more specifically to morally legitimize 
fracking in Phases II and III, following earlier reliance of the industrial stakeholders on modes of 
coercion and manipulation that became reported in the media. As explained by an interviewee 
from the government, delegating the promotion of the shale gas industry to Lucien Bouchard was 
a clever move, as he could credibly speak in the name of the ‘common good’ in Québec. 
M. Bouchard after he left office, has spoken a lot publicly for the economy, for the use of 
new energies, for productivity, hence it was making good sense to have someone like Lucien 
Bouchard as a spokesperson. Then at the same time, having Lucien Bouchard who could go 
against the opponents [to fracking] in the public sphere… this was a well-respected person, 
who was able to reply to opponents. (Interview 3, GOV) 
Delegation may therefore be regarded as a way to avoid the justification of forms of power 
employed at an earlier stage that could be difficult to justify subsequently (in the case of the 
industry, coercion through the use of economic resources), and it is consistent with both 
manipulation and domination. Indeed, delegation involves both manipulation, in the form of 
network positioning and relationship development, so as to engage the new spokesperson, and 
domination, to the extent that more covert and latent forms of power are still being exercised. 
Mechanism 1b: Multiplication. In contrast to delegation, which reflects the constraining 
influence of prior uses of power on subsequent modes of justification, multiplication emerged 
from our inductive analysis as a mechanism by which prior uses of power enable the possibilities 
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for justification. Multiplication occurs when the uses of power led to the enrollment of actors 
from different segments of society who can extend the repertoire of normative orders of worth. In 
so doing, multiplication increases the moral legitimacy of stakeholders as well as their capacity to 
influence the moral illegitimacy or legitimacy of the technology at stake in the controversy. 
The mechanism of multiplication is well illustrated by the effects produced by the civil 
society organizations’ use of manipulation (at Phases I and II) on their subsequent capacity to 
engage in diversified justifications (at Phases II and III). The extensions of the civil society 
organizations’ power through their active positioning within networks or through the enrollment 
of other stakeholders led to the diversification and consolidation of the already-in-use orders of 
worth for a stakeholder group (e.g., scientists and academics providing sound counter-arguments 
to undermine justifications from other stakeholders), and they created unprecedented and new 
possibilities for justification within the extended network. As reported by an activist from the 
civil society: 
… we had a lot of actors, we had the citizen committees that started mushrooming, we had 
the environmental groups, especially the ALQPA [an environmentalist group focused on the 
protection of air quality] that has been the whistle-blower group, the artists, and the scientific 
who could have been called on the front stage yet were thus far voiceless (Interview 10, 
CSO) 
In enrolling actors from a broad diversity of segments of civil society and various fringes of 
local communities, civil society organizations benefited from an extended repertoire of normative 
orders of worth available to them as well as from the capacity to back these orders of worth 
within appropriate proofs (e.g., reports of scientific evidence). 
Power of Justification Mechanisms 
Mechanism 2a: Reshaping perceived uncertainty. Through mechanism 2a, the mobilization of 
diverse moral justifications by stakeholders in the public sphere shapes the general perception of 
the riskiness of a practice, and in so doing, they maintain or restrict their own ability, as well as 
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that of other stakeholders, to mobilize forms of power. The processes by which a product or 
business practice becomes perceived as risky are central to our late-modern time (Beck, 1992), 
and recent organizational studies suggest that corporations have to manage risks when their 
technology presents potential losses for stakeholders (Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin-Anderson and Power, 
2006). Maguire and Hardy (2013) suggest that a product ‘becomes’ more or less risky depending 
on how meanings that can constitute products as ‘risk objects’ are shaped. These authors, in line 
with Beck (1992), also show how changes in meanings that constitute products as risk objects 
contribute to reshaping social orders and, potentially, power relations. The mechanism of 
reshaping perceived uncertainty captures the specific influence of justification on such an 
alteration of power dynamics. 
Through the three stages of the controversy, we observed that civil society organizations, the 
government, and the oil and gas industry have competed to shape and define the risks associated 
with fracking, and their prior justification work (at Phases I and II) has shaped their subsequent 
capacity to mobilize specific forms of power (at Phases II and III). For instance, the justification 
discourse of a civil society organization stressing the health, safety, and environmental dangers of 
fracking enhanced the ‘moral illegitimacy’ of shale gas extraction from the perspective of the 
industrial and environmental ‘worlds’, subsequently diminishing the formal authority of the 
stakeholder in charge of the civic world: the local government. 
If the government wants to go forward with extraction, they’ll have to scientifically prove 
that there aren’t any consequences. Very often, the risks are in the method of extraction. 
They take what they need and then they bugger off. We can’t get away with that, especially 
not in a populated area near Richelieu and one with fairly large groundwater tables that could 
be contaminated for several years. (Le Devoir, 17/08/2010) 
The growing uncertainty surrounding the fracking technique, which resulted from the 
justifications of civil society organizations, rendered coercion or overt forms of manipulation 
delicate and potentially counter-productive situations for industry stakeholders; this may explain 
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why they refocused their efforts through domination, a covert form of power. Still, our analysis 
does not suggest that reshaping perceived uncertainty is specific to certain orders of worth. 
Mechanism 2b: Recovering institution. The recovering institutions mechanism reflects the 
process whereby justification, in forcing institutions to play their role or to be realigned with their 
purpose, restructures networks of power and/or stakeholders’ capacity to use formal authority. 
Recovering institutions involves the mobilization of justifications that point to normative 
definitions of how institutions and, more generally, democracy should operate. It builds mainly 
on arguments related to the civic order of worth. 
The discursive moves within and around the BAPE hearings offers the most striking 
illustration of this mechanism. In intensively mobilizing the civic order of worth and drawing 
media attention to the need to call for the BAPE, civil society organizations in a sense ‘forced’ 
the government to play its role. Although the BAPE hearings in the province’s countryside were 
organized and conducted with an eye to minimizing the intervention of civil society 
organizations—for instance, by relegating the spokespersons of NGOs and citizens to the end of 
the meeting’s agenda, after experts from the industry and the oil and gas associations had spoken 
for hours (Interviews 4 and 10)—this forum nevertheless permitted alternative justifications to be 
made that would eventually lead the government-appointed facilitators of the BAPE hearings to 
acknowledge the risks associated with shale gas extraction. This acknowledgement would 
undermine the government’s power throughout the remainder of the controversy, while 
consolidating the power of the opposition parties and civil society organizations. Accordingly, 
the effects of recovering institutions seem to emerge mainly as a by-product of justifications 
grounded in the civic order of worth. 
HOW THE MECHANISMS EXPLAIN THE CONTROVERSY’S OUTCOME 
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Using the four mechanisms, we can now address our initial question: how could a de facto 
moratorium on shale gas exploration emerge in Québec despite the broad adoption of fracking in 
numerous North American jurisdictions, strong support from the provincial government and a 
favorable power position initially enjoyed by the oil and gas industry? 
Although our first account of the controversy have shown that stakeholders’ mobilizations of 
power and justifications played a key role in the controversy’s progression, each perspective was 
insufficient to provide an explanation of the complete changes in stakeholders’ power balance 
and in the moral legitimacy of fracking that occurred throughout the controversy. More 
importantly, this initial account overlooked how the relationships between justification and 
power—which we capture through the power of justification and the justification of power 
mechanisms—produced effects that played a crucial role in the controversy. Building on these 
findings, we can now revisit the two major turns of the controversy and show how the 
mechanisms linking power and justification influenced them and, in so doing, shaped the 
controversy’s outcome. Figure 2 summarizes the main mechanisms we induced from our first and 
second findings in a ‘justification-power framework’ that can be used to clarify and illustrate how 
the four mechanisms explain the main shifts in the controversy. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Crucial Shift from Phase I to Phase II: Change in the Public’s Perception of Fracking 
A first crucial shift in the controversy that occurred between Phase I and II points to the drastic 
reconsideration of the moral legitimacy of the fracking technology and the parallel establishment 
of its ‘riskiness’ in the public opinion and among the various stakeholder groups. Although our 
first findings have highlighted the crucial importance of the justifications provided by civil 
society organizations in this shift, the mechanisms complement this analysis by specifying the 
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conditions that enabled this stakeholder group to reshape the perception of the riskiness of 
fracking while explaining the relative ineffectiveness of the oil and gas associations.    
On the one hand, the frontal use of coercive and manipulative forms of power by the oil and 
gas industry associations at the start of the controversy led them to adopt a low profile in the 
public debate and restricted their credibility when mobilizing orders of worth other than those 
grounded in the market and, to a lesser extent, green worlds. Delegation mechanism (1a) started 
to play a central role, with reliance on the government during this first period to ‘sell’ shale gas 
and the fracking technology to the public. As an insider from the Liberal party observed: 
In fact, the government found itself advocating for the industry in spite of itself, since the 
industry hadn’t done its preliminary work in the field and, as a government that had set its 
sights on job creation and economic development as well as the development of a new 
energy source in Québec... (Interview 3, GOV) 
Although the government was highly vocal through the first phase of the controversy, it was 
relatively poorly prepared to advocate for fracking in a context of rapid intensification and 
complexification of the debates. This situation undermined the capacity of governmental and 
industrial groups to protect the moral legitimacy of the fracking technology while preventing 
these two stakeholder groups from benefiting from the ‘power of justification’ mechanisms.  
On the other hand, the power tactics focused on the networking and enrollment of multiple 
stakeholders used by civil society organizations to make them benefit fully from the 
multiplication mechanism (1b) through Phase II: they accessed a broader repertoire of 
justifications anchored in multiple orders of worth, and they enrolled groups of activists and 
scientists who could build credibly on the green or industrial orders of worth while 
deconstructing some of the market rationales advanced by the government and industry 
stakeholder groups. Hence, civil society organizations could exploit the mechanism of reshaping 
perceived uncertainty (2a) in relation to fracking. Mechanisms (1b) and (2a) reinforced their 
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effects to consolidate both the power and justifications of civil society organizations—and, 
subsequently, of ‘anti-fracking’ political opposition parties—enabling the establishment of the 
moral illegitimacy of fracking in the media, completing a shift in the public’s attitude toward the 
riskiness of fracking. 
Crucial Shift from Phase II to Phase III: Change in the Position of the Government 
The second crucial shift of the controversy that, together with the prior shift in public opinion, led 
to the de facto moratorium—the change in the government’s attitude and position in relation to 
the fracking technology—was also arguably related to power and justification interactions. The 
civil society organizations’ maintenance and consolidation of their power tactics related to their 
network positioning from Phase II to Phase III maintained the benefits gained from the 
multiplication mechanism (1b), producing effects that made it possible for them to benefit from 
the two facets of the ‘power of justification’ (2a, 2b). First, the reshaping perceived uncertainty 
mechanism (2a) restricted the oil and gas industry stakeholders’ capacity to engage in forms of 
power such as coercion or manipulation that would immediately backlash in the media if known, 
and it continued undermining the credibility of the government’s advocacy of the shale gas 
industry. As a result, industrial stakeholders had to continue to rely on manipulation, triggering 
the delegation mechanism (1a), notably through the mobilization of Lucien Bouchard as their 
spokesperson. Although several of our interviewees recognized that this move could have 
changed the turn of the controversy to the benefit of the industry if it had happened earlier, the 
moral illegitimacy of fracking was too well established in the public opinion at this stage. As one 
of our interviewees concluded: ‘although it was a clever move for the industry to use Lucien 
Bouchard, I think it was ‘not enough and far too late’’ (Interview 3, GOV). 
Second, the intensive mobilization of justifications by civil society organizations and 
opposing parties triggered the recovering institution mechanism (2b), first by forcing the 
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government to (reluctantly) call upon the BAPE (from Phase I to Phase II) and then by 
supporting the voicing of counter-arguments through the multiple public hearings conducted in 
the context of the BAPE (from Phase II to Phase III). Once this institution delivered a report 
shedding light on the riskiness of fracking in a context within which the public opinion had 
already turned against fracking, the government could not continue backing the industry. This 
second turn would establish the condition for the de facto moratorium that prevented further 
exploration of shale gas through the fracking technology. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Contributions 
In theorizing how justification and power interact and influence a controversy, this study makes a 
twofold contribution. First, our analysis contributes to PCSR studies by providing a new 
integrative ‘justification-power framework’ that considers multiple facets of power and clarifies 
how stakeholders elaborate their legitimacy claims by using multiple moral foundations. This 
alternative framework for studying sustainability controversies advances current PCSR theory on 
its normative side by considering insights on justification from the EW perspective. In so doing, 
it engages with the content of actors’ normative arguments, and hence usefully complements 
prior Habermasian studies (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). The ‘justification-power framework’ also 
extends PCSR theory on its political side by integrating Lukes’ (2005) ‘radical’ conceptualization 
of power. Through our analysis, we show how justification and power interact in ways that shape 
the moral legitimacy of a new technology. Our results show how the interactions of power and 
justification influenced the main turns of a controversy and ultimately explain its outcome. 
Our second core contribution is the theorization of the power of justification and justification 
of power mechanisms that capture thus far neglected interfaces of justification and power. On the 
one hand, although Lukes’ (2005) theorization of power left room for the consideration of moral 
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values, few students of power have examined whether moral justifications can alter power 
dynamics. On the other hand, Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) value-focused framework has 
recurrently been criticized for lacking a consideration of power (Cloutier and Langley, 2013; 
Edwards and Willmott, 2008), although recent works from Boltanski and his colleagues have 
aimed to clarify the thus-far-neglected relationships between domination and justification in 
institutions (Boltanski, 2011; Boltanski et al., 2014; Susen and Turner, 2014). In line with these 
works, our findings cross-fertilize research on power and justification by showing that uses of 
power shaped stakeholders’ subsequent justifications and that justification could alter subsequent 
power dynamics through four mechanisms that capture the justification of power and the power 
of justification. Our findings, summarized in Figure 2, show how these mechanisms contribute to 
explaining the outcome of the controversy. Beyond our controversy context, the framework and 
its four associated mechanisms have important implications for research and practice. 
Implications of the Justification-Power Framework for Political CSR 
Insights for studying multi-stakeholder and CSR standardization initiatives. The resulting 
justification-power framework can support empirical studies of other sustainability controversies 
as well as longitudinal analyses of how power and justification interplay in multi-stakeholder 
contexts and, hence, contribute to the analysis of the design of CSR or global governance 
standards (Gilbert, Rasche and Waddock, 2011; Mena and Waeger, 2014). For instance, our 
framework usefully complements analyses of multi-stakeholder initiatives that adopt the 
Habermasian approach to deliberative democracy, such as the study proposed by Hahn and 
Weidtmann (2012) to analyze the production of ISO 26000. These works typically focus on how 
various forms of normative legitimacy are constituted through deliberations. Even when they 
recognize the superior power of some stakeholders, they neglect the fact that power and 
justifications interact in ways that can shape the deliberative dynamics and, hence, the resulting 
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CSR or governance standards. Our mechanisms offer here a useful ‘toolkit’ that can be used 
beyond the case of the moral legitimacy of a technology to account for the complex interactions 
of power and justification in the constitution of the normative legitimacy of CSR and governance 
standards and metrics such as ISO 26000 or the GRI and CSR ratings. In sensitizing policy-
makers and standard-setting organizations to neglected interactions between justification and 
power, our framework can help these actors design more-effective deliberative processes when 
launching multi-stakeholder initiatives focused on the production of private regulations or 
CSR/governance standards. 
The justification-power framework also complements the growing stream of studies that 
have started unpacking how CSR standards and metrics gain regulative power (Haack, 
Schoeneborn and Wickert, 2012; Slager, Gond and Moon, 2012) and support political dynamics 
(Giamporcaro and Gond, 2015) by drawing scholars’ attention to the need to consider the 
underlying processes by which these metrics are morally justified and to account for the influence 
of these justification dynamics on their regulative power. From a practical viewpoint, our 
analysis can then benefit managers from organizations who have successfully developed CSR 
metrics by clarifying the importance of the normative foundations of their work. 
The normative regulation of power through justification. Sociologists, political scientists, and 
institutional scholars are well aware of the links between power and various forms of legitimacy. 
Parsons (1967) defined power as the legitimized implementation of decisions to move toward 
collective goals—an aspect that corresponds to authority in our paper—whereas Scott reminds us 
(1987, p. 502) that ‘legitimated power is regulated power’. Nevertheless, the conceptualization of 
power has expanded to encompass multiple dimensions beyond authority (Lukes, 2005). Not all 
forms of power are ‘legitimated’ or institutionally regulated (Fleming and Spicer, 2014), and 
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students of power in the critical tradition have tended to reduce moral arguments to rhetorical 
strategies of manipulation (Boltanski, 2012). 
In specifying a class of social mechanisms linking power and justification, our study 
advances the analysis of the normative regulation of power. Our mechanisms complement the 
‘managerial’ form of domination theorized by Boltanski (2011) by suggesting that justification 
can support power not just by facilitating domination. First, the mechanism of delegation (1a) 
may usefully reinforce and complement the domination of some social groups by letting other 
stakeholders do the work of justification, which does not solely consist in promoting change but 
may involve a richer set of orders of worth. Second, our results show that manipulation may also 
effectively sustain subsequent justifications through the expansion of actors’ networks, with the 
aim to challenge established or dominant stakeholder groups. This was highlighted by the process 
of multiplication (1b) in the case of civil society organizations in the controversy. Hence, all the 
facets of power can potentially shape stakeholders’ justification work. 
Reciprocally, the power of justification mechanisms (2a, 2b) highlight that justifications can 
both serve the purpose of domination and contribute to reshaping the availability of power bases 
to actors. It can even produce power either by shaping uncertainty or by enabling the recapture 
of institutions, with the civic mode of justification playing a crucial role in this respect. As a 
whole, our case study suggests that the ‘capture’ of governments or political institutions by 
corporate actors is not an irreversible process: civil society organizations can re-capture the 
regulative power of the state through adequate and timely forms of justification. 
The four mechanisms we offer here can support further theorizing of the interfaces between 
power and legitimacy and help theorize how different facets of power shape the moral boundaries 
within which justification takes place as well as the moral boundaries of various modes of power, 
in line with recent studies that aim at capturing the ‘legitimation politics’ (Fransen, 2012, p. 163). 
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These mechanisms show the fruitfulness of considering multiple facets of power beyond 
authority or domination to fully appreciate how power and justification interact. 
From a more pragmatic viewpoint, these mechanisms and our case study can inform multiple 
stakeholder groups about how overlooked connections of power and justification can influence a 
controversy’s outcomes. In line with a recent study about the political tactics underlying 
normative legitimacy constitution (Mena and Weager, 2014), our case shows that civil society 
organizations can effectively influence the outcome of sustainability controversies when they 
manage to combine ‘multiplication’ with the power of justification mechanisms to recover 
political or public forums and institutions. Industry leaders may also learn that partnering with 
government and other influential potential leaders may not be sufficient if the government’s 
authority is undermined by a lack of normative consolidation of its power through justification. 
Bridging levels and rebalancing perspectives in political CSR. Although our focus in this paper 
was on the meso-level of stakeholder interactions, the power-justification framework is also 
relevant to the individual level of analysis and could serve multilevel studies of PCSR. The work 
of justification is indeed usually conducted by individual spokespersons, and Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s (2006) framework focuses on how individuals engage with higher-level moral orders 
(Cloutier and Langley, 2013) that are typically discussed in the more ‘macro’ literature on PCSR 
(Frynas and Stephens, 2014). Accordingly, the justification-power framework can be tailored to 
investigate PCSR at the individual level of analysis, for instance, by focusing on how corporate 
spokespersons, politicians or individual representatives of the local community interact with each 
other in the public sphere (newspapers, parliaments) or during public hearings. The framework 
can also be adapted to investigate how normative issues interact with power games across the 
macro, meso and micro levels of analysis that remain disconnected in PCSR studies (Frynas and 
Stephens, 2014). 
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Finally, the justification-power framework can also support the development of a ‘balanced’ 
approach to PCSR that recognizes how the logic of appropriateness (conformity with social 
norms) and the logic of consequentiality (strategic behavior) interact (March and Olsen, 1989). 
The justification-power framework considers essential the institutional and democratic processes 
of legitimacy-building as well as a consideration of a variety of approaches to the common good 
as essential to the dynamics of justification. In addition, it acknowledges how power or other 
forms of strategic behaviors can alter these processes. In so doing, it offers a mid-range theory 
that takes the normative dimension of justification seriously (Bitektine and Haack, 2015) while 
recognizing the existence of multiple forms of power. It can thus avoid the pitfalls of excessive 
naivety or excessive cynicism in studying PCSR. 
38 
 
REFERENCES 
Arendt, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1963). ‘Decisions and nondecisions: An analytical framework’. 
American Political Science Review, 57, 3, 641–51. 
Banerjee, S. B. (2010). ‘Governing the global corporation: A critical perspctive’. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 20, 2, 265–74. 
Bansal, P. and Roth, K. (2000). ‘Why companies go green: A model of ecological 
responsiveness.’ Academy of Management Journal, 43, 4, 717–36. 
Basaure, M. (2011). ‘An interview with Luc Boltanski: Criticism and the expansion of 
knowledge’. European Journal of Social Theory, 2, 3, 361–81.  
Batellier, P. and Sauvé, L. (2011). ‘La mobilisation des citoyens autour du gaz de schiste au 
Québec: les leçons à tirer’. Gestion, 36, 49–58. 
Bauer, D. and Palazzo, G. (2011). ‘The moral legitimacy of NGOs as partners of corporations’. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 21, 4, 579–604. 
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity.  Tousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Bitektine, A. and Haack, T. (2015). ‘The macro and the micro of legitimacy: Towards a multi-
level theory of the legitimacy process’. Academy of Management Review, 40, 1, 49–75. 
Boltanski, L. (2011). On Critique. A Sociology of Emancipation. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Boltanski, L. (2012). Love and Justice as Competences. Cambridge:  Polity Press. (Original 
French edition from 1990.) 
Boltanski, L. Fraser, N. and Corcuff, F. (2014). Domination et Anticipation pour un Renouveau 
de la Critique Sociale. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon. 
Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L. (2006 [1991]). On Justification: Economies of Worth. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. (Original French edition from 1991.) 
Burawoy, M. (1998) ‘The extended case method.’ Sociological Theory, 16, 1, 4–33. 
Cloutier, C. and Langley, A. (2013). ‘The logic of institutional logics: Insights from French 
pragmatist sociology’. Journal of Management Inquiry. 22, 4, 360–80. 
Dahl, R. (1957). ‘The concept of power’. Behavioural Science, 2, 3, 201–15. 
Edwards, P. and Willmott, H. (2008). ‘Corporate citizenship: Rise or demise of a myth?’ 
Academy of Management Review, 33, 771–73. 
Fleming, P. and Jones, M. T. (2013). The End of Corporate Social Responsibility. Crisis and 
Critique. London: Sage. 
Fleming, P. and Spicer, S. (2014). ‘Organizational power in management and organization 
science’. Academy of Management Annals, 8, 1, 201–15. 
Fransen, L. (2012). ‘Multi-stakeholder dialogue and voluntary programme interactions: 
Legitimation politics in the institutional design of corporate social responsibility’. Socio-
Economic Review, 10, 1, 3–28. 
39 
 
Frynas, J. G. and Stephens, S. (2014). ‘Political corporate social responsibility: Reviewing 
theories and setting new agendas’. International Journal of Management Reviews, doi: 
10.1111/ijmr.12049. 
Giamporcaro, S. and Gond, J.-P. (2015). ‘Calculability as politics in the construction of markets: 
The cas of socially responsible investment in France.’ Organization Studies (forthcoming). 
Gilbert, D. U., Rasche, A. and Waddock, S. (2011). ‘Accountability in a global economy: The 
emergence of international accountability standards.’ Business Ethics Quarterly, 21, 1, 23–44. 
Gond, J.-P., Kang, N. and Moon, J. (2011). ‘The government of self-regulation: On the 
comparative dynamics of corporate social responsibility’. Economy and Society, 40, 4, 640–71. 
Haack, P., Schoeneborn, D. and Wickert, C. (2012). ‘Talking the talk, moral entrapment, 
creeping commitment? Exploring narrative dynamics in corporate responsibility standardization’. 
Organization Studies, 33, 5-6, 815–45. 
Hahn, R. and Weidtmann, C. (2012), ‘Transnational governance, deliberative democracy, and the 
legitimacy of ISO 26000: Analyzing the case of a global multistakeholder process’, Business and 
Society, doi: 10.1177/0007650312462666. 
International Energy Agency (2012). 2012 Annual Report. Available at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/IEA_Annual_Report_publicversion.
pdf (accessed 15 September 2014). 
Lafaye, C. and Thévenot, L. (1993). ‘Une justification écologique? Conflit dans l’aménagement 
de la nature’. Revue Française de Sociologie, 34, 4, 495–524. 
Langley, A. (1999). ‘Strategies for theorizing from process data’. Academy of Management 
Review, 24, 4, 691–710. 
Lukes, S. (2005 [1974]). Power: A Radical View. London: MacMillian 
Maguire, S. and Hardy, C. (2013). ‘Organizing processes and the construction of risk: A 
discursive approach’. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 1, 231–55. 
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of 
Politics. The Free Press: New York.  
Mena, S. and Palazzo, G. (2012). ‘Input and output legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives’. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 22, 3, 527–56. 
Mena, S. and Wagner, D. (2014). ‘Activism for corporate responsibility: Conceptualizing private 
regulation opportunity structures.’ Journal of Management Studies. 51, 7, 1091–117. 
Palazzo, G. and Scherer, A. G. (2006). ‘Corporate legitimacy as deliberation: A communicative 
framework’. Journal of Business Ethics, 66, 1, 71–88.  
Parsons, T. (1967). Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New York: Free Press. 
Patriotta, G., Gond, J.-P. and Schultz, F. (2011). ‘Maintaining legitimacy: Controversies, orders 
of worth, and public justifications’. Journal of Management Studies, 48, 8, 1804–36. 
Rousseau, J.-J. (1994 [1762]). The Social Contract. In Discourse on the Political Economy and 
the Social Contract. Trans. Christopher Bretts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
40 
 
Scherer, A. G. and Palazzo, G. (2007). ‘Toward a political conception of corporate responsibility: 
Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective’. Academy of Management Review, 
32, 4, 1096–1120. 
Scherer, A. G. and Palazzo, G. (2011). ‘The new political role of business in a globalized world: 
A review of a new perspective on CSR and its implications for the firm, governance, and 
democracy’. Journal of Management Studies, 48, 4, 899–931. 
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G. and Seidl, D. (2013). ‘Managing legitimacy in complex and 
heterogeneous environments: Sustainable development in a globalized world’. Journal of 
Management Studies, 50, 2, 259–84. 
Scheytt, T., Soin, K., Sahlin-Anderson, K. and Power, M. (2006). ‘Introduction: Organization, 
risk and regulation.’ Journal of Management Studies, 43, 6, 1331–37. 
Scott, R. S. (1987). ‘The adolescence of institutional theory’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
32, 4, 493–511. 
Shonkoff, S. B., Hays, J. and Finkel, M. L. (2014). ‘Dimensions of shale and tight gas 
development’. Environmental Public Health, 122, 8, 587–795. 
Slager, R., Gond, J.-P. and Moon, J. (2012). ‘Standardization as institutional work:  The 
regulatory power of a responsible investment standard.’ Organization Studies, 33, 5-6, 763–90. 
Smith, A. (1991 [1776]). The Wealth of Nations. Books 1—3. Intro. Andrew S. Skinner. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin books. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1991). ‘The conditions of fruitfulness for theorizing about social 
mechanisms in social sciences’. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 21, 3, 367–88. 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). ‘Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches’. Academy 
of Management Review, 20, 3, 571–611. 
Susen, S. and Turner, B. S. (Eds.) (2014). The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the ‘Pragmatic 
Sociology of Critique’. London: Anthem Press. 
Yin, R. K. (2008). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4
th
 ed.). London: Sage. 
41 
 
FIGURE 1.  Temporal indicators of the controversy* 
 
 
*Note: to obtain this figure, we plotted the publication of the 196 newspaper reports and the 640 justifications coded in these articles. 
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FIGURE 2.  A consolidated justification-power framework 
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TABLE I. Illustrations of the coding of ‘common worlds’ 
Common worlds Illustrative quotes from the dataset (a quote may also refer to another order of worth) 
Civic ‘On Monday, the Quebec Federation of Municipalities said its members are deeply concerned about shale gas exploration in the province and want to be 
involved in government and industry consultations on the subject.’ (The Gazette, 25/08/2010) 
‘The image is in for a rough reexamination this fall as Environment Minister Pierre Arcand and deputy premier and Natural Resources Minister Nathalie 
Normandeau announced on Sunday that the government will launch an aggressive schedule of environmental review and legislative overhaul that could pave the 
way for a new natural-gas industry.’ (The Gazette, 30/08/2010) 
Green ‘There is no doubt that this new sector is extremely promising. However, things must be done properly, especially when we pride ourselves on being a green 
champion. Ms Normandeau and the industry are convinced that shale gas extraction presents almost no environmental risk.’ (Le Devoir, 05/06/2010)  
‘Municipalities are particularly worried by the consequences of it [i.e. shale gas mining] has on sources of drinking water and on how water used to extract the 
gas will be treated.’ (The Gazette, 30/08/2010) 
Industrial ‘A representative of the Municipal Affairs Ministry said that if hundreds of wells were being drilled every year, existing water-treatment facilities would not be 
able to accommodate the volume of waste water coming from shale operations.’ (The Gazette, 15/11/10) 
‘[Arcand] set a “June or July” deadline for a new committee of experts he will name to study the unknown hazards of fracking and the waste water it generates.’ 
(The Gazette, 09/03/2011) 
Market ‘The Minister of the Environment, Sustainable Development, and Parks, Pierre Arcand, sang the praises of the virtues of shale gas, all the while deploring the 
lacunae of the industry. “The math is simple,” he said. “We have to improve Québec’s trade balance and reduce our dependency on fuel oil. Québec imports 13 
billion dollars worth and the gas industry can help us with 2 billion.”’ (La Presse, 29/01/2011)  
‘It’s a budding sector and we have the chance, as a society, to see this sector grow. ‘It’s rather rare that we can be present at such a birth, one that can bring 
extreme benefits to several communities and to our economy.’ Ms Normandeau here highlights the possibility of creating more than 7,500 jobs—a number that 
comes, however, from the industry itself.’ (Le Devoir, 05/06/2010) 
Domestic ‘[Minister Raymond Bachand] underlined that the reform of the mining act, announced last year, brought Québec from being “the cheapest province in Canada” 
for the mining industry to the most expensive, with immediate benefits to public finances.’ (La Presse, 18/03/2011)  
 ‘“If we are able to start producing gas, I can see a day when it will play a bigger role than oil in meeting our energy needs” Normandeau said.’ (The Gazette, 
27/04/2010) 
Inspirational ‘“In our debates, we often look at ourselves in a harsh light. However, when you add it all up, Québec is incontestably amongst the best of what humanity has to 
offer,” declared Jean Charest. “With this inaugural speech, I’m inviting Quebecers to think, to imagine, to dream of, and to construct Québec in a world where 
new spaces add up to create new dimensions,” he professed, not without emphasis. “More than ever, Québec is in a position to distinguish itself.”’ (Le Devoir, 
24/02/2011) 
Fame ‘Minister Normandeau said she was “surprised” by the hiring of Lucien Bouchard. “It’s very good news, she said. She believes that the industry “has work to do 
to revive its image.” According to her, the “rallying” talents of Mr. Bouchard should help to “make the debate more rational” and to “create a climate of trust.” 
The leader of the ADQ, Gérald Deltell, is also delighted by this announcement. “It’s excellent news for Québec to have a man of Lucien Bouchard’s moral fiber 
to tackle head on this issue that’s essential to our economic future.”’ (La Presse, 26/01/2011) 
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TABLE II.  Mobilization of orders of worth and forms of power through the controversy 
Stakeholder groups Phase I – Unearthing the controversy Phase II – Politicization of the controversy Phase III – Spreading and cooling-down 
Government    
 
Modes of Justification 
  
 
Forms of Power Authority: the government’s use of its legal authority to 
postpone the call for the BAPE and to exclude opponents to 
shale gas from the committee 
Manipulation through agenda setting: framing the BAPE’s 
mandate to avoid a moratorium 
Manipulation through network (re)positioning: 
government tries to reposition itself as a ‘third party’ actor 
distant from the industry and mainly focused on the 
welfare of Québecers 
Authority: The government mobilizes the BAPE to demonstrate its 
early commitment and transparency to the provincial population and 
calls for a strategic environmental assessment on fracking and shale 
gas to address the uncertainties of fracking 
Industry    
 
Modes of Justification 
 
 
 
Forms of Power Coercion through the use of economic and legal resources: 
industry mobilizes its right to start exploring without 
waiting for public hearings; industry actors contemplate the 
possibility of suing civil society representatives who voiced 
oppositions to shale gas 
Manipulation through network positioning and enrollment: 
industry enrolls government as its spokesperson 
Domination: Industry recruits former Prime Minister of 
Québec and former Parti Québécois leader as its 
representative and main spokesperson – investment in 
public relations to manufacture consent 
Domination: Industry continues to use the former Prime Minister of 
Québec and former Parti Québécois leader as its representative and 
spokesperson– lobbying continued to manufacture consent 
Civil Society    
Organizations 
 
Modes of Justification 
  
 
Forms of Power Manipulation through network positioning and 
stakeholders’ enrollment. Enrollment of multiple groups: 
mayors, researchers, groups of artists, opposition parties, 
and francophone media 
Coercion: direct pressure through the organization of public 
demonstrations 
Authority in linguistic resistance: use of the legal right to 
be addressed in French in Québec 
Manipulation through agenda setting and (re)setting: 
opposition parties and activists question government’s 
ability to enforce legislation on shale gas 
Coercion through access to alternative sources of 
(academic) knowledge: use of reports and alternative 
information produced by scholars involved in the 
controversy to shape discussions in local BAPE hearings 
Manipulation through agenda setting: use of reports produced by 
scholars for an alternative source of information in the environmental 
strategic assessment 
Coercion through direct pressure and the use of legal resources: Use 
of the right to organize public demonstrations to demonstrate the 
broad opposition to shale gas from the population 
Legend for the modes of Justification:   
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TABLE III.  Illustrations of coding of the four facets of power from Lukes (2005) 
Facets of power from 
Lukes 2005 (p. 35) 
Illustrative example from 
the controversy 
Specific aspects of power 
observed 
Supporting quotes from the interviews and secondary data 
Authority 
Use of legal or legitimized 
forms of authority in a 
context of conflict of 
interests. E.g.: 
 Using formal roles in 
rational-legal 
bureaucracies 
 Governmental or local 
authority decision-
making 
Government’s deliberate 
postponing of calling for 
the BAPE, exclusion of 
opponents of shale gas 
from the expert 
committee, and drastic 
reduction of its time 
frame (GOV, Phase I) 
Direct mobilization of 
power derived from a 
formal position 
Overt mode 
‘It wasn’t a BAPE that was questioning the legitimacy of shale gas but a 
BAPE that was aiming to implement shale gas. (…) It was insulting to 
have a BAPE declared very late that was already quite flimsy and with a 
narrow mandate.’ (Interview 10, CSO) 
‘The government’s mandate to BAPE is remarkably narrow. A serious one 
would have asked the agency to explore the environmental risks of mass 
drilling for natural gas and then to make a recommendation as to 
whether or not the government should permit such drilling... (…) ’ (The 
Gazette, Period I) 
Coercion 
Threat of deprivation to 
obtain compliance, 
usually through access to 
resources or to 
information. E.g.: 
 Use of force 
 Suppression of access to 
key resources 
 Mobilization through 
demonstrations 
Civil society organizes 
public demonstrations to 
demonstrate the broad 
support from the 
population and put 
pressure on the 
government and the 
industry (CSO, Phase 
III) 
Direct pressure on the 
government and the 
industry through 
demonstrations 
Overt modes (covert 
mode possible) 
‘Well, I was at a lot of protests. So I don’t really remember the dates but we 
were at a lot of protests, including the Earth Day protest in 2011. And 
that culminated in—there was a big protest on Earth day in 2012. I was 
also there, and the Parti Québécois was really present too; Mrs Marois 
was there with several deputies and candidates.’ (Interview 9, CSO) 
‘Although undeniably festive, the event was, in fact, a demonstration 
against shale gas development in Quebec. It drew people from villages 
and towns all over the province, who came by the busload with signs 
that read, Protect Our Drinking Water and, Charest, You Give Me Gas!’ 
(The Gazette, Period III) 
Manipulation 
‘Actors seek to either limit 
the issues that are 
discussed or fit issues 
within (what are 
perceived to be) 
acceptable boundaries’ 
(Fleming & Spicer, 
In parliament, Activists 
and the opposition 
continued to question the 
government’s ability to 
monitor the shale gas 
industry (CSO, Phase II) 
Agenda setting:  shaping 
priorities at meetings 
and in the media 
Covert and overt modes 
‘As for the PQ opposition, they deemed properly “scandalous” the 
hesitations and the about-turn of the government. Civil servants brought 
Minister Nathatlie Normandeau “to her senses” in making her 
understand that simply and completely shutting down the well would 
have brought her load of troubles to the government, who would have 
become responsible for it, declared the PQ spokesperson for Mining 
Affairs, Scott McKay. (Le Devoir, Phase III). 
‘They (the opponents) also found themselves with the official opposition in 
parliament, who was on their side and who became their spokesperson in 
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2014: 242). E.g.: 
 Agenda Setting  
 Network positioning 
 Enrolling or co-opting 
other groups 
 Mobilization of bias 
parliament every day.’ (Interview 3, GOV) 
Domination 
‘Attempts to make 
relations of power 
appear inevitable 
and natural’ 
(Fleming & Spicer, 
2014: 241). E.g.: 
 Manufacturing consent 
 Making things appear 
inevitable 
 Articulating ideologies 
Industry recruits a former 
Prime Minister and 
former leader from the 
‘Parti Québécois’ to 
support its public 
relations efforts (GOV, 
Phase II) 
Attempts at making power 
relations appear as 
inevitable and natural 
Latent mode 
‘They named Lucien Bouchard the representative of the Association, they 
added a more Francophone touch; I think their public director at that 
time was also a Francophone.’ (Interview 3, GOV). 
‘At the height of the shale gas controversy, there were nearly fifty-some 
lobbyists registered only for the issue of shale gas in Quebec.’ 
(Interview 4, OBS) 
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TABLE IV.  Mechanisms linking power and justification 
Mechanism Dimension Description Types of power 
or justification 
involved 
Intentionality Illustrations from the case corresponding to changes 
across phases 
The Justification of 
Power 
Power(t)  
Justification(t+1) 
 
How power 
constrains or enables 
subsequent uses of 
justification 
Delegation  Letting other actors with 
different forms of power 
do the work of 
justification  
Grounded in 
domination 
Deliberate The industry can barely defend its use of power in 
Phase I and lets the government and M. Bouchard 
defend its position and justify the shale gas industry 
in Phases II and III 
Multiplication Enhancing the repertoire 
and robustness of 
available justifications 
through access to new 
actors via network 
positioning and 
enrollment 
Grounded in 
manipulation 
Deliberate and/or 
emerging 
Through the intensive use of network positioning and 
enrollment in Phase I (and Phase II), civil society 
organizations mobilize multiple actors that can 
engage critically with all types of justification and 
provide more robust justifications to challenge the 
formal position of the government and the industry in 
spaces of moral legitimacy during Phase II (and 
Phase III) 
The Power of 
Justification 
Justification(t)  
Power(t+1) 
 
How justification 
constrains or enables 
subsequent uses of 
power 
Reshaping 
perceived 
uncertainty 
Demonstrating through 
justification the 
uncertainty of outcomes 
to counterbalance the 
‘fait accompli’ 
Not dependent 
on specific 
orders of 
worth  
Both deliberate and 
emerging 
Civil society organizations mobilize justifications to 
make the lack of information about fracking explicit 
in Phase I (and Phase II), restricting the possible 
uses of formal authority or episodic forms of power 
by the government and the industry  
Recovering 
institutions 
Forcing institutions to 
play their role and in so 
doing, restructuring 
networks of power and 
possible uses of formal 
authority 
Grounded in 
the civic 
order of 
worth 
Both deliberate and 
emerging 
Civil society organizations mobilize justifications in 
Phase I (and Phase II) to force the government to 
call on the BAPE, limiting its discretionary use of 
formal authority as well as the capacity of the 
industry to formally network with the government in 
Phase II (and Phase III) 
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APPENDIX A. SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Identification of the newspapers articles used in the analysis 
Name of the 
Journal 
Type Political orientation (a) Articles quoting  
“shale gas” 
(b) Articles on shale 
gas in Québec 
Relative 
relevancy Federalist vs. 
Sovereigntist 
Conservative 
vs. Soc.-Dem. n % n % (b) / (a) 
The Globe and 
Mail (GM) 
National Federalist Soc.-Dem. 267 11.78% 7 3.57% 2.62% 
The National 
Post (NP) 
National Federalist Cons.  178 7.86% 2 1.02% 1.12% 
The Toronto 
Star (TS) 
Provincial 
(Ontario) 
Federalist Soc.-Dem. 52 2.29% 1 0.51% 1.92% 
The Montreal 
Gazette (MG) 
Provincial 
(Montreal) 
Federalist Cons. 247 10.90% 47 23.98% 19.03% 
Le Journal de 
Montreal (JM) 
Provincial 
(Montreal) 
Balanced Cons. 
(tabloid)  
24 1.06% 4 2.04% 16.67% 
La Presse (P) Provincial 
(Montreal) 
Rather 
Federalist 
Soc.-Dem. 478 21.09% 56 28.57% 11.72% 
Le Devoir (D) Provincial 
(Montreal) 
Sovereigntist Soc.-Dem. 612 27.01% 71 36.22% 11.60% 
Le Soleil (S) Québec-
City 
Rather 
Federalist 
 Soc.-Dem. 408 18.01% 8 4.08% 1.96% 
Total    2266  196  8.65% 
 
Interviews with observers and representatives of the stakeholder groups 
Interviewee Profile 
Stakeholder 
categorization* 
Interview length 
1 Representative of a civil society organization CSO 37 min 
2 
Researcher – Member of the committee for 
Environmental Strategic Studies 
OBS 
22 min 
3 Staff of the Government during the period 2010-2012 GOV 52 min 
4 Journalist OBS 36 min 
5 
Researcher engaged in the debate during the period 
2010-2012 
CSO 
48 min 
6 NGO – Environment CSO 25 min 
7 NGO – Artists CSO 36 min 
8 
Mayor of a local municipality affected by the 
exploration (early stage) 
GOV 
39 min 
9 
Depute for the opposition party during the period 
2010-2012 
CSO 
31 min 
10 
Researcher, leader and initiator of citizen movement 
around shale gas in Québec 
CSO 
56 min 
11 Representative of the Gas Industrial Association IND 50 min 
12 
Representative of ‘Québec Business Council on the 
Environment’ 
IND 
45 min 
    
Total 
 CSO = 6; IND = 2; 
GOV = 2; OBS= 2 
 
 
* Acronyms: CSO stands for Civil Society Organizations, IND for industry representatives, GOV for member of 
the provincial government or of local governmental bodies, OBS for third party observers such as journalists or 
experts who have followed the whole controversy; NGO for Non-Governmental Organizations. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i
 A chronology of the controversy as well as supplementary information about the secondary data sources and 
supplementary information about the results of the coding are available from the authors upon request. 
ii
 In the end, we decided on the following list of key stakeholders: the oil and gas industry association; Lucien 
Bouchard (spokesperson for the oil and gas industry association); green and environmentalist NGOs (e.g., Equiterre, 
AQLP); other groups from civil society (e.g., local associations of citizens opposed to shale gas exploration); the 
BAPE; the government ministers, namely, Arcand (Sustainable Development), Bachand (Finance and Revenue), and 
Charest (Prime Minister); Normandeau (Minister of Natural Resources and Wildlife during the first two phases); 
Simard (Minister of Natural Resources and Wildlife at phase three); other governmental organizations; and 
opposition parties (e.g., Parti Québécois). To facilitate the presentation of justifications, we clustered most of these 
actors into three broad groups: one, the oil and gas industry association (including Bouchard); two, the government 
(grouping all the Ministers from the government); and three, organizations from civil society (including green 
NGOs). For the sake of simplicity, we followed Mena and Weager (2014) and grouped these stakeholders in three 
broad categories in some part of our analysis and in our narrative: Civil society organizations, Industry and 
Government. 
iii
 The BAPE was created in the 1980s to provide a forum for the generation and exchange of information on projects 
with environmental impacts. It usually organizes local hearings about an issue and has a consultative but non-
authoritative role, that is, it has no direct decision-making power. For information, please consult the BAPE Website: 
http://www.bape.gouv.qc.ca/sections/mandats/. 
iv
 Source: http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/environnement/2011/03/08/003-rapport-bape-gaz-schiste.shtml. 
Retrieved December 15, 2014. 
